Temur Umarov: It is true that there are two big animals in the forest that have the biggest influence on Central Asian foreign policy which are Russia and China. China is very dynamic and energetic, it's a growing partner for Central Asian states, but Russia's influence should not be underestimated. Russia here is still #1 in the rank of the most influential partners for Central Asia. Central Asia understands Russia much better than China.

I don't think Beijing has a strategy to become a total leader of all parts of life in Central Asia and to do this against Russian national interests. This happens naturally. CA states have their own interests and perspectives of the way they are moving, tools for development and their place in global politics. China has come out to be the closest country and the most suitable economic partner. Because of that, China is becoming a dominant power in economic relations of the Central Asia region and of the world. However, China is not a cultural influencer for Central Asian society yet, it's only in the process of transferring its economic achievements into other spheres. Sometimes Beijing makes mistakes, sometimes it wins people's hearts, but regarding culture, it's too early to say that China is more successful than Russia.

It looks very similar to the situation with the Russian Far East in some media: everybody is afraid of growing Chinese influence there and some people are sure Russia is losing its control on the Far East. In reality, there aren't any evil intentions from China and most processes are developing in their natural way.

Temur Umarov: Again, here China is losing to Russia. At the very beginning, it seemed that China had an upper hand in vaccine diplomacy. Uzbekistan, for example, started testing one of the Chinese vaccines. at that moment when Russian was only elaborating vaccines. But the situation has completely changed: Russia's Sputnik V vaccine is widely successful and (acknowledged by the leading medical journal Lancet), Kazakhstan has already started the vaccination with Sputnik V and will be producing the vaccine on its territory. Kyrgyzstan requested the Russian vaccine, Uzbekistan registered a Sputnik V as well (Sputnik V has had the biggest uptake across the region, with deliveries already made to Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Uzbekistan, which is running trials on a Chinese option, is the only country in this neighbourhood engaging in large-scale vaccine cooperation with Beijing - Nikkei Asia). Even Turkmenistan, which still denies cases of COVID-19 on its territory, also decided to start negotiations about vaccination with Russia. Moreover, we haven't seen any Chinese vaccine to become as effective as Sputnik V as well as any proposals from the Chinese side to start production of the vaccine in Central Asia countries.

In Central Asia, the narrative of low-quality of Chinese products is still alive, although China today invents and produces plenty of hi-tech things. The technological progress in China is far away from what it was in the 90s, but the stereotypes are too strong It's obviously risky to start producing Chinese vaccine or to make the Chinese vaccine the only option for citizens in countries where anti-China sentiments are very high.

Temur Umarov: American education is considered very desirable, but not very available. It is always a very limited amount of people who can access it. Almost the same situation concerns European top universities. I guess this is a typical story for all developing countries. The unique feature of Central Asia is that it's bordered by China, and China is very much interested in creating a community of fans of Chinese culture who could spread their love in their native countries. China is actively using education as a tool: there are about 40 Confucius Institutes with 20000 students learning Chinese in five Central Asian countries. If we take a look at statistics, the number of people moving to China for studying is tens of thousands. In 2017 it was about 30000 people from all the Central Asian states who were pursuing their studies in Chinese universities.

At the same time, the US invite no more than 3000 students per year. But again, if we compare China with the US, it is a kind of "quality vs. quantity" example. China as a growing power is willing to attract as many students as possible with low prices and major grants. About 90% of Kyrgyz students go to China for free. Also, Chinese private companies use soft power tools in their practice, for example, Huawei as the biggest tech corporation has a program Seeds for Future, where they have different competitions. The best students from Central Asian technological universities can participate, win and then work in Huawei in China. Not many countries do that in Central Asia, it's hard to imagine that Google, Apple or Yandex will conduct such a competition among Central Asian students. This helps to create a bridge between education and work. People in Central Asia understand well that by learning Chinese you get new working opportunities. This is a tremendous stimulus to study the language, travelling and having a job in China or in their own country.

Temur Umarov: Yes, let's take Kazakhstan as an example. You have an economy that relies heavily on oil and gas. About 25% of oil and gas production is produced by Chinese companies or in partnership with them. If you know Chinese culture and language, you'll receive a job in this sector. This is not the same with English, which is already a must-have in any of the working fields. Mandarin is still a powerful advantage and a tool to win the competition.

Temur Umarov: The Belt and Road Initiative is an umbrella project and it is terrifically difficult to describe. It seems like Beijing is especially making it vaguer. Most projects are under this umbrella, and everything China already does in Central Asia can be called a part of the BRI, even the projects which were started before the announcement of this initiative. In this context, it's hard to understand what people in Central Asia think about the BRI in reality, no one knows what the BRI is. On average, people just don't care about the BRI since it doesn't affect their lives tangibly.

Temur Umarov: In fact, there were useful projects for Central Asia, especially in infrastructure and large-scale investments. They created some opportunities in terms of international connections in the region. For example, Kazakhstan came up with its own idea of Nyrly Zhol to put together with Chinese projects (Nyrly Zhol is a domestic economic stimulus plan of development which is intended to turn Kazakhstan into a key Eurasian transport and logistics hub by modernizing roads, railways and ports). This allowed Kazakhstan to attract more investments in the projects of state interest. In other countries where the level of political elites' unity is not that so high as in Kazakhstan, the BRI became a source of constant political disruption and scandals (for instance, in Kyrgyzstan). Politicians use Chinese projects to compete with their opponents, and we've seen lots of conflicts around Chinese investments. This also negatively affects the Chinese image in Kyrgyzstan, increasing anti-Chinese sentiments in the country.

Temur Umarov: Actually, Xi's image is not present in Central Asian public opinion at all. The amount of news with the figure of the Chinese leader is so low, that I guess people mostly don't know how he looks like or what is the agenda around him. I wouldn't say he's more or less popular except the people who are individually interested in Chinese affairs. In contrast, Vladimir Putin's image and popularity are unprecedentedly high, everybody knows him for sure. I suppose, there are several reasons for such a contrast., President Xi usually doesn't come to Central Asian states, there were just a few visits. Then he very rarely, if ever, speaks about Central Asia. On the contrary, President Putin has visited Central Asian countries many times, he is the leader of Russia that is the Soviet Union successor, and also he has been in power longer than Xi Jinping. The Central Asian media are influenced by Russian narratives much stronger than by Chinese ones. Here is why we see this drastic contrast.

Temur Umarov: For now, all the buzz about China has not been natural. People are not interested in the Chinese culture, history, language and then in China itself, in China's future. Young people in Central Asia begin to learn more about China with a very pragmatic desire to boost their future careers. These thousands of students studying in Confucius classes appeared not because people were inspired by the 5000 year's history or the traditional calligraphy.

China has to deal with a very difficult mission of making its soft power really operational taking into account a tiny comprehension of China in the global world. Currently, people get information about China not from Chinese sources, but primarily from international media or social networks. Recently, the main part of the recent China's news is about Beijing policy in the Xinjiang region which doesn't contribute to a positive image of China, especially when it comes to Kazakhstan or Kyrgyzstan and other places where people have their relatives in Xinjiang.

The main thing China attempts to do is to become more proactive in social media. Experts call it "wolf-warrior diplomacy": all Chinese diplomats have registered on Twitter for this activity online. Once I indeed faced such a wolf-warrior person who offended me for my article about Pax-Sinica and the Chinese expansion into Central Asia. Anyway, China at least tries to implement some soft power tools in its diplomacy, but China still didn't find a way to make it successfully. To be honest, I don't think we'll see flourishing Chinese public diplomacy in the nearest future. People interest in China will remain pragmatic and economy-oriented.