Interview with Dmitry Suslov
«U.S. soft power is much broader than regime change»
- Dmitry SuslovDeputy Director of the Centre for Comprehensive European and International Studies at Higher School of Economics, Senior Lecturer at the School of International Economics and Foreign Affairs at HSE
- PICREADI presents a new conversation about soft power in the United States with Dmitry Suslov, Deputy Director of the Centre for Comprehensive European and International Studies at Higher School of Economics, Senior Lecturer at the School of International Economics and Foreign Affairs at HSE, member of Russian International Affairs Council and Valdai International Discussion Club.
What the United States attracts the world with and whether the US dominate among other countries, you can find out in our new material.
PICREADI: Dmitry, the United States is considered as one of the main ideologists and creators of the soft power concept. Largely, it was the United States that promoted modern tools of soft power. What does it attract with, what is the secret?
Dmitry Suslov: The United States has traditionally taken the world by the dynamism of its development and rapidity of its success. The foundation of American soft power is what the United States has traditionally been, rather than what the United States has done.
For most of its history, the United States was a successful model of political, economic, and foreign policy development. It was swiftly increasing and gaining more power. The U.S. demonstrated very high standards of living and the level of accumulated wealth.
Values have played and continue to play a major role in American soft power. The main value on which the American political system is built is freedom: one of the most attractive ideas in the history of mankind. Political freedoms spelt out in the Bill of Rights – first ten amendments to the U.S. Constitution, the focus of the American public system on protecting them, separation of powers horizontally and vertically, independence of the judiciary and the rule of law – all this made the United States attractive for millions of people from repressive, authoritarian and totalitarian states.
America is also an example of the most stable political system. The American Constitution has never been revised. Within the evolution of the United States, the American political system made it possible to solve a lot of issues and overcome contradictions, preserve internal harmony and efficiency of the state.
Other attractive factors are economic dynamism of the United States, relative fairness in terms of equality of opportunity: the absence of aristocratic privileges in the U.S., some class distinctions typical for European societies until the second half of the 20th century. This became the basis of the so-called 'American dream' – opportunity for everyone, regardless of their origin, race or religion, to achieve personal success in the United States.
For most of its history, the United States was a successful model of political, economic, and foreign policy development. It was swiftly increasing and gaining more power. The U.S. demonstrated very high standards of living and the level of accumulated wealth.
Values have played and continue to play a major role in American soft power. The main value on which the American political system is built is freedom: one of the most attractive ideas in the history of mankind. Political freedoms spelt out in the Bill of Rights – first ten amendments to the U.S. Constitution, the focus of the American public system on protecting them, separation of powers horizontally and vertically, independence of the judiciary and the rule of law – all this made the United States attractive for millions of people from repressive, authoritarian and totalitarian states.
America is also an example of the most stable political system. The American Constitution has never been revised. Within the evolution of the United States, the American political system made it possible to solve a lot of issues and overcome contradictions, preserve internal harmony and efficiency of the state.
Other attractive factors are economic dynamism of the United States, relative fairness in terms of equality of opportunity: the absence of aristocratic privileges in the U.S., some class distinctions typical for European societies until the second half of the 20th century. This became the basis of the so-called 'American dream' – opportunity for everyone, regardless of their origin, race or religion, to achieve personal success in the United States.
It is also worth mentioning the great achievements of American civil society. This applies to both technological achievements and leadership, scientific discoveries, and mass culture: Hollywood, the American way of life, Broadway, musicals, many genres of music... All this created the basis of American soft power.
Lastly, the foreign policy component of American attractiveness cannot be overlooked: in two hundred years, the U.S. has evolved from thirteen colonies on the Atlantic coast to the only superpower with a global military presence and the global system of alliances, a currency that is the world's reserve currency and the main currency of international settlements; evolved to the country that today accounts for 40% of world military spending, and after World War II accounted for 50% of global GDP. Since the second half of the 1940s, the United States acted as a benevolent hegemon for dozens of countries within the U.S. sphere of influence. It became the main producer of global public goods for the capitalist world. Within the framework of American hegemony, the new statehood of Germany, Japan and South Korea was built, the European and Japanese post-war economic miracle occurred, and political elites looked at the United States as the Creator, protector and benefactor. In the Western European and Asian U.S. allies, the establishment cannot imagine life without an alliance with America, American presence and leadership, some kind of 'Homo atlanticus', if we talk about the European, especially West German elite.
Lastly, the foreign policy component of American attractiveness cannot be overlooked: in two hundred years, the U.S. has evolved from thirteen colonies on the Atlantic coast to the only superpower with a global military presence and the global system of alliances, a currency that is the world's reserve currency and the main currency of international settlements; evolved to the country that today accounts for 40% of world military spending, and after World War II accounted for 50% of global GDP. Since the second half of the 1940s, the United States acted as a benevolent hegemon for dozens of countries within the U.S. sphere of influence. It became the main producer of global public goods for the capitalist world. Within the framework of American hegemony, the new statehood of Germany, Japan and South Korea was built, the European and Japanese post-war economic miracle occurred, and political elites looked at the United States as the Creator, protector and benefactor. In the Western European and Asian U.S. allies, the establishment cannot imagine life without an alliance with America, American presence and leadership, some kind of 'Homo atlanticus', if we talk about the European, especially West German elite.
A group of people stage a rally to welcome the upcoming visit by President Donald J. Trump in downtown Seoul
But in recent years, the United States has been undergoing significant changes, its political system has entered a crisis. Today it is characterized by an unprecedented polarization since the Civil War of the 1860s between Democrats and Republicans, progressists and conservatives, left and right. Democrats are becoming increasingly left-wing and Republicans – right-wing, and they can't agree on almost anything, regard each other as enemies, and talk about the need to dismantle the other party's political legacy. This polarization is based on the deep division of American society regarding values and socio-economic principles. The elections held in November demonstrated this very clearly. The economic development of the United States has become characterized by inequality becoming greater and greater and stagnation of income, decrease in standards of living of a significant part of the population. All of this, of course, undermines American soft power and makes the country less attractive than it was for most of its history.
I will also add that the international context has previously worked for the soft power of the United States. It allowed to emphasize the contrast between the United States and non-free, repressive states: in the 19th century and in the first half of the 20th century, most European countries were authoritarian. When there were the Soviet Union and the communist system with 'totalitarian' political systems, this also emphasized attractiveness of the United States as the leader of the 'free world'.
Today, there is no such contrast between the United States and its global rivals: both Russia and China are countries with market economies. The U.S. has nothing to oppose itself so zealously with. Hence, it attempts to artificially revive the old contrast that existed during the Cold War, presenting its confrontation with Russia and China as a conflict of 'freedom and non-freedom', emphasizing the undemocratic nature of the political regimes of Russia and China, the role of the Chinese Communist Party, and thereby trying to increase its own attractiveness. The United States understands that a new global split, characteristic of what took place during the Cold War, would help it become attractive again. Therefore, the U.S. again desperately positions itself as the 'leader of the free world', protecting freedom and democracy from aggression from the Russian and Chinese 'dictatorships'.
I will also add that the international context has previously worked for the soft power of the United States. It allowed to emphasize the contrast between the United States and non-free, repressive states: in the 19th century and in the first half of the 20th century, most European countries were authoritarian. When there were the Soviet Union and the communist system with 'totalitarian' political systems, this also emphasized attractiveness of the United States as the leader of the 'free world'.
Today, there is no such contrast between the United States and its global rivals: both Russia and China are countries with market economies. The U.S. has nothing to oppose itself so zealously with. Hence, it attempts to artificially revive the old contrast that existed during the Cold War, presenting its confrontation with Russia and China as a conflict of 'freedom and non-freedom', emphasizing the undemocratic nature of the political regimes of Russia and China, the role of the Chinese Communist Party, and thereby trying to increase its own attractiveness. The United States understands that a new global split, characteristic of what took place during the Cold War, would help it become attractive again. Therefore, the U.S. again desperately positions itself as the 'leader of the free world', protecting freedom and democracy from aggression from the Russian and Chinese 'dictatorships'.
PICREADI: Indeed, as you mentioned, the United States has largely shaped its image via popular culture. Nevertheless, can we claim that mass culture produced by Hollywood and American 'superstars' is still dominant in the world? Or have some serious rivals appeared in this sphere?
Dmitry Suslov: I think the United States remains the undisputed leader in popular culture. If we look at film distribution, Hollywood continues to be a trendsetter in the world of cinema. And cinema is one of the main means for broadcasting American mass culture, popularizing the American way of life, creating a favourable image of the U.S. as a country of unlimited opportunities, justice and superheroes. A country where the human personality and individuality are respected, where the life of a small person is worth no less than the life of a top official. The vast majority of films are still American films.
What do young people, including Russians, listen to? First, it is a continuation of American traditions and traditions of some American subcultures. Therefore, there are still no competitors who could challenge the United States in the field of mass culture.
Another matter is that American mass culture has become less perceived and welcome than before in many countries and world regions due to the strengthening of their own civilizational identity. This well applies to Asian, Middle Eastern and Muslim countries. There, elements of the American way of life have recently been perceived less positively and often caused the rejection. But I do not yet see any other global source of mass culture that could compete with the United States.
What do young people, including Russians, listen to? First, it is a continuation of American traditions and traditions of some American subcultures. Therefore, there are still no competitors who could challenge the United States in the field of mass culture.
Another matter is that American mass culture has become less perceived and welcome than before in many countries and world regions due to the strengthening of their own civilizational identity. This well applies to Asian, Middle Eastern and Muslim countries. There, elements of the American way of life have recently been perceived less positively and often caused the rejection. But I do not yet see any other global source of mass culture that could compete with the United States.
PICREADI: Before we move on to politics, I have one more question about culture. Do you consider British popular culture to be an extension of American culture, something that complements it? Or is it a separate movement? There are quite popular British films, music, there are particular traditions of theatre covering the whole world. In particular, Great Britain's former colonies are still focused on the UK. Or should we look at British culture as part of one huge Anglo-Saxon culture?
To a much lesser extent, the UK translates its popular culture into soft power in terms of political and foreign policy influence. The U.S. is doing it more actively.
Dmitry Suslov: On the one hand, it is part of Anglo-Saxon culture, on the other hand, Britain, of course, is its separate component. Still, this is different mass culture: English humour differs from American humour, English films differ from American, you could say, it is more refined. British music, 'The Beatles', and not only them, are the part of the British cultural heritage.
However, in terms of global impact, I would say that they are close but separate from each other. To a much lesser extent, the UK translates its popular culture into soft power in terms of political and foreign policy influence. The U.S. is doing it more actively.
American pop-culture, like many elements of American foreign policy, is aimed at transforming other civilizations and peoples. In Britain, this exists to a lesser extent. The U.K. is close to the U.S., it is also attractive, but I would not consider it as a competitor in this case.
However, in terms of global impact, I would say that they are close but separate from each other. To a much lesser extent, the UK translates its popular culture into soft power in terms of political and foreign policy influence. The U.S. is doing it more actively.
American pop-culture, like many elements of American foreign policy, is aimed at transforming other civilizations and peoples. In Britain, this exists to a lesser extent. The U.K. is close to the U.S., it is also attractive, but I would not consider it as a competitor in this case.
PICREADI: Now I would like to talk a little bit about Donald Trump. During his presidential term, there was much criticism about his rejection of soft power methods and preference of hard power. Joseph Nye has also repeatedly and openly criticized Trump. So, what has Donald Trump done to U.S. soft power?
Dmitry Suslov: It is hard to say anything for sure. He mostly weakened American soft power. However, the figure of Donald Trump, his statements and actions made Trump's America more attractive to European right-wing conservatives, for those segments of the population who are dissatisfied with the results of globalization, for many countries that value independence, sovereignty, their cultural and civilizational features. Therefore, it is impossible to say that Trump only negatively affected U.S. soft power.
However, Donald Trump has significantly weakened the external active components of American soft power, which we have not yet discussed. And soft power is not only what the state, the country is, but also what the country does in the outside world. These include foreign aid, respect or disrespect for international law, legitimacy of foreign policy, production of global public goods, participation in global governance, and contribution to solving global problems. This has traditionally been a very important foundation of American soft power. In absolute terms, the United States has been the world's main donor: it spends more than other countries on foreign aid. The United States has also done a lot in organizing the fight against global challenges.
Donald Trump has significantly increased selfishness and weakened the benevolent part of American hegemony. He declared that America would serve only its own narrow, selfish interests. Trump significantly reduced American foreign aid and openly talked about aid as a tool of bribery: we will help not those who need it, but those who openly support American foreign policy initiatives. Donald Trump has greatly weakened the U.S. contribution to fight against common challenges and threats, such as climate change and coronavirus pandemic. He withdrew the United States from important international institutions and regimes that organize international cooperation to combat these challenges: the Paris Agreement and the World Health Organization. Trump has generally reinforced one-sidedness of American foreign policy – desire to act alone, unwillingness to listen to opinions of other countries, even close allies. He emphasized a utilitarian approach to allies. American actions under Trump have become less legitimate in the international arena than, for example, under Obama. And all this hit active foreign policy tools of soft power.
There is one more reason. And it's not just Trump's fault. Under Trump, the division of American society dramatically widened. The internal political struggle sharply intensified, which became absolutely fierce and, accordingly, the crisis and paralysis of the American political system deepened. This social breakdown and internal polarization significantly have undermined the first principle of American soft power – the United States as a successful model of development.
During the Trump presidency, the American political system was in the state of stupor. The intensity of the struggle was off the scale. This undermined the image of the United States as a successful country and political system that effectively copes with all problems. As a result, many questioned the functionality of the United States in its current state.
Under Donald Trump, inequality in the United States continued to increase, the gap between the poor and the rich continued to grow. Under Trump, racial divisions in American society also intensified. Pogroms, protests, dumping of monuments, clashes between right and left, Republicans and Democrats weaken the American appeal.
However, Donald Trump has significantly weakened the external active components of American soft power, which we have not yet discussed. And soft power is not only what the state, the country is, but also what the country does in the outside world. These include foreign aid, respect or disrespect for international law, legitimacy of foreign policy, production of global public goods, participation in global governance, and contribution to solving global problems. This has traditionally been a very important foundation of American soft power. In absolute terms, the United States has been the world's main donor: it spends more than other countries on foreign aid. The United States has also done a lot in organizing the fight against global challenges.
Donald Trump has significantly increased selfishness and weakened the benevolent part of American hegemony. He declared that America would serve only its own narrow, selfish interests. Trump significantly reduced American foreign aid and openly talked about aid as a tool of bribery: we will help not those who need it, but those who openly support American foreign policy initiatives. Donald Trump has greatly weakened the U.S. contribution to fight against common challenges and threats, such as climate change and coronavirus pandemic. He withdrew the United States from important international institutions and regimes that organize international cooperation to combat these challenges: the Paris Agreement and the World Health Organization. Trump has generally reinforced one-sidedness of American foreign policy – desire to act alone, unwillingness to listen to opinions of other countries, even close allies. He emphasized a utilitarian approach to allies. American actions under Trump have become less legitimate in the international arena than, for example, under Obama. And all this hit active foreign policy tools of soft power.
There is one more reason. And it's not just Trump's fault. Under Trump, the division of American society dramatically widened. The internal political struggle sharply intensified, which became absolutely fierce and, accordingly, the crisis and paralysis of the American political system deepened. This social breakdown and internal polarization significantly have undermined the first principle of American soft power – the United States as a successful model of development.
During the Trump presidency, the American political system was in the state of stupor. The intensity of the struggle was off the scale. This undermined the image of the United States as a successful country and political system that effectively copes with all problems. As a result, many questioned the functionality of the United States in its current state.
Under Donald Trump, inequality in the United States continued to increase, the gap between the poor and the rich continued to grow. Under Trump, racial divisions in American society also intensified. Pogroms, protests, dumping of monuments, clashes between right and left, Republicans and Democrats weaken the American appeal.
PICREADI: Do you think that under Joseph Biden soft power active components will increase? How effective will it be in conditions of political chaos?
Dmitry Suslov: The Biden administration will not be able to fully restore American soft power and, most likely, will not be able to stop its weakening due to fundamental problems within the American society. Biden will remain the president of one half of America. The other half of America will hate him, try to bring him damage – not only in domestic but also in foreign policy. The stupor of the American political system will continue.
On the other hand, the Biden administration will certainly intensify soft power active tools and increase American foreign aid. The Biden administration will consider fighting against climate change as one of the main foreign policy priorities in order to position the United States as a producer of public goods and a benevolent hegemon. Under Biden, the United States will return to UNESCO and the World Health Organization. And Biden to a much greater extent will use multilateral tools for solving foreign policy problems such as Iran's nuclear program. Rhetoric toward allies will become less utilitarian: Biden, at least, will not claim that the United States will protect allies as long as allies pay for these services.
This will positively affect American soft power. Those steps will be quite feasible under Biden, since they depend on the Administration and, to a lesser extent, on the Congress. Congress is needed to approve budgets. Of course, Republicans will oppose increasing the budget for foreign aid. It is very important who controls Congress. So far, Republicans control the Senate, but the outcome of the Georgia state election, scheduled for January (the Russian version of the interview was published in December 2020 – editor's note) will determine who will control it. In two years, the United States will hold Congressional midterm elections: the entire House of Representatives and one-third of the Senate are going to be re-elected. The results will largely depend on the well-being of the United States in 2021-2022, the ability of the Biden administration to improve the economic situation and smooth out the problem of racial, value and socio-economic division. Since it will be extremely difficult to succeed here, Republicans may regain control of the House of Representatives in 2023. Then it will be more difficult for Biden to increase foreign aid, but it will also be possible.
In a word, we will see an intensification of soft power active components under Biden, even though the passive components will remain weak.
On the other hand, the Biden administration will certainly intensify soft power active tools and increase American foreign aid. The Biden administration will consider fighting against climate change as one of the main foreign policy priorities in order to position the United States as a producer of public goods and a benevolent hegemon. Under Biden, the United States will return to UNESCO and the World Health Organization. And Biden to a much greater extent will use multilateral tools for solving foreign policy problems such as Iran's nuclear program. Rhetoric toward allies will become less utilitarian: Biden, at least, will not claim that the United States will protect allies as long as allies pay for these services.
This will positively affect American soft power. Those steps will be quite feasible under Biden, since they depend on the Administration and, to a lesser extent, on the Congress. Congress is needed to approve budgets. Of course, Republicans will oppose increasing the budget for foreign aid. It is very important who controls Congress. So far, Republicans control the Senate, but the outcome of the Georgia state election, scheduled for January (the Russian version of the interview was published in December 2020 – editor's note) will determine who will control it. In two years, the United States will hold Congressional midterm elections: the entire House of Representatives and one-third of the Senate are going to be re-elected. The results will largely depend on the well-being of the United States in 2021-2022, the ability of the Biden administration to improve the economic situation and smooth out the problem of racial, value and socio-economic division. Since it will be extremely difficult to succeed here, Republicans may regain control of the House of Representatives in 2023. Then it will be more difficult for Biden to increase foreign aid, but it will also be possible.
In a word, we will see an intensification of soft power active components under Biden, even though the passive components will remain weak.
PICREADI: I think we should clarify the terminology in our conversation. I suppose you have repeatedly encountered with an established view among both Russian scientists and politicians that the whole soft power activity of the United States is aimed at conducting 'colour revolutions': overthrowing regimes and promoting US protégés into the political establishment of other countries. Do you agree with this interpretation?
Dmitry Suslov: I agree that the policy aimed at regime change is one of the elements of this active component of American soft power. But I do not agree that all active components of the United States soft power are aimed at organizing 'colour revolutions', undermining state foundations and multiplying chaos. This is certainly not the case.
The soft power of the United States, its active components are aimed at weakening regimes that are hostile to the United States. I absolutely agree with this. The U.S. uses foreign aid to build a clientele in foreign countries and to increase influence among political elites and civil societies of foreign countries. This has a crucial impact during 'colour revolutions'.
However, the fact is that not only American soft power is a crucial factor for the success of a 'colour revolution'. First, you have to work with the other country for a long time. Secondly, we need an objective domestic political crisis in the country where the United States would like to conduct a regime change through a 'colour revolution'. If there is no real domestic political crisis, then there will probably be no 'velvet revolution' either.
In a time of crisis, the United States mobilizes the clientele that it has built up over the years with its foreign aid policy. Then, the 'velvet revolution' implies not only soft power but also hard power – hard pressure and blackmailing in relation to the current government of the other country. This implies very tough pressure, threats of sanctions, isolation and so on. Thus, the States not only supports demonstrations and protesters supported by those NGOs and politicians who have received American assistance for many years but also contributes to the paralysis of the government.
Remember how much pressure the Obama administration exerted on Yanukovych during the Euromaidan in Ukraine and how much pressure the United States exerted on Kuchma in 2004 during the 'orange revolution'. They openly said then that if the results of the presidential elections were not annulled, Kyiv would be in international isolation. That is hard power.
So, when we talk about the impact of the United States on unfriendly regimes, in the change of which they are interested, then soft power becomes a tool for regime change. But the U.S. soft power affects not only unfriendly countries. It is also being applied to allies and partners of the United States. For example, one of the main traditional recipients of American aid is Israel. The state receives $3 billion annually from the United States free of charge. Is America trying to organize a 'colour revolution' there? In friendly countries, soft power is not so destructive. Plus, one of the most important active components of American soft power is still the organization of fight against transnational threats, and that is not about regime change at all. Therefore, the active components of the U.S. soft power are much broader than regime change.
The soft power of the United States, its active components are aimed at weakening regimes that are hostile to the United States. I absolutely agree with this. The U.S. uses foreign aid to build a clientele in foreign countries and to increase influence among political elites and civil societies of foreign countries. This has a crucial impact during 'colour revolutions'.
However, the fact is that not only American soft power is a crucial factor for the success of a 'colour revolution'. First, you have to work with the other country for a long time. Secondly, we need an objective domestic political crisis in the country where the United States would like to conduct a regime change through a 'colour revolution'. If there is no real domestic political crisis, then there will probably be no 'velvet revolution' either.
In a time of crisis, the United States mobilizes the clientele that it has built up over the years with its foreign aid policy. Then, the 'velvet revolution' implies not only soft power but also hard power – hard pressure and blackmailing in relation to the current government of the other country. This implies very tough pressure, threats of sanctions, isolation and so on. Thus, the States not only supports demonstrations and protesters supported by those NGOs and politicians who have received American assistance for many years but also contributes to the paralysis of the government.
Remember how much pressure the Obama administration exerted on Yanukovych during the Euromaidan in Ukraine and how much pressure the United States exerted on Kuchma in 2004 during the 'orange revolution'. They openly said then that if the results of the presidential elections were not annulled, Kyiv would be in international isolation. That is hard power.
So, when we talk about the impact of the United States on unfriendly regimes, in the change of which they are interested, then soft power becomes a tool for regime change. But the U.S. soft power affects not only unfriendly countries. It is also being applied to allies and partners of the United States. For example, one of the main traditional recipients of American aid is Israel. The state receives $3 billion annually from the United States free of charge. Is America trying to organize a 'colour revolution' there? In friendly countries, soft power is not so destructive. Plus, one of the most important active components of American soft power is still the organization of fight against transnational threats, and that is not about regime change at all. Therefore, the active components of the U.S. soft power are much broader than regime change.
PICREADI: What do you think, does Russia need to defend itself from the US soft power?
Photo by Corinne Kutz on Unsplash
Dmitry Suslov: I think that Russia needs to defend itself against those elements of American soft power that are aimed at domestic political transformation and destabilization in Russia. And Russia does this. But, of course, Russia does not need to defend itself against those elements of soft power that are passive in nature or do not have a clear focus on regime change. There is no need to fall into complete neo-isolationism, to close, to do what the Soviet Union did – to ban American music, movies, jeans, and so on. 'Today he dances jazz, and tomorrow he will sell his Homeland' is a very destructive approach, which in many ways led the USSR to collapse.
Russia should remain an open society, open to the manifestations of American soft power, but at the same time having its own identity, its own soft power, national idea, patriotism. You can watch Hollywood movies, listen to American music, travel to the United States, but you have to love your Homeland. American soft power becomes dangerous when your own is reduced to zero. Then it comes to 'American boy, I'll run away with you' (Russian pop-song by Kombinatsiya duo which was popular in last years of the USSR existence and after its collapse– editor's note.) The problem here is not in America but in ourselves.
Russia should remain an open society, open to the manifestations of American soft power, but at the same time having its own identity, its own soft power, national idea, patriotism. You can watch Hollywood movies, listen to American music, travel to the United States, but you have to love your Homeland. American soft power becomes dangerous when your own is reduced to zero. Then it comes to 'American boy, I'll run away with you' (Russian pop-song by Kombinatsiya duo which was popular in last years of the USSR existence and after its collapse– editor's note.) The problem here is not in America but in ourselves.
PICREADI: Is it necessary to protect others? For example, neighbouring countries, the post-Soviet space?
Dmitry Suslov: Neighboring countries and the post-Soviet space are still independent states. Therefore, it will be very strange if Russia somehow protects them from US soft power. Instead of trying to protect them, Russia needs to strengthen its own soft power and position itself as no less or even a more attractive partner than the US. And it will be much more efficient and productive, and less confrontational.
Certainly, Russia needs to convey to the elites of neighbouring countries that the consequences of American policy can be dangerously destabilizing, but they know this themselves. The most important thing that Russia should do now is to strengthen its own attractiveness, active and passive components of its soft power policy.
In addition, it is necessary to understand that the attractiveness of the United States in the post-Soviet space is largely artificial. It is a consequence of the desire of some post-Soviet elites to use the United States to protect and distance itself from Russia.
When Georgian and Ukrainian politicians glorify American values, it must be clearly understood that they tell a lie. They don't believe what they're saying. They simply utter ritual phrases that are pleasant to the United States in order to minimize Russian influence. The United States is used as a defender against Russia, as a factor that helps individual countries of the post-Soviet space to get out of the Russian orbit. It is not just that the United States is attractive. There is a strong element of manipulation in this discourse.
Here, rather, we need to raise the question of how to convince these countries to pursue a more balanced policy. They should not stop loving American values and begin to love some particular Russian values, no. Actually, they don't like American values.
Certainly, Russia needs to convey to the elites of neighbouring countries that the consequences of American policy can be dangerously destabilizing, but they know this themselves. The most important thing that Russia should do now is to strengthen its own attractiveness, active and passive components of its soft power policy.
In addition, it is necessary to understand that the attractiveness of the United States in the post-Soviet space is largely artificial. It is a consequence of the desire of some post-Soviet elites to use the United States to protect and distance itself from Russia.
When Georgian and Ukrainian politicians glorify American values, it must be clearly understood that they tell a lie. They don't believe what they're saying. They simply utter ritual phrases that are pleasant to the United States in order to minimize Russian influence. The United States is used as a defender against Russia, as a factor that helps individual countries of the post-Soviet space to get out of the Russian orbit. It is not just that the United States is attractive. There is a strong element of manipulation in this discourse.
Here, rather, we need to raise the question of how to convince these countries to pursue a more balanced policy. They should not stop loving American values and begin to love some particular Russian values, no. Actually, they don't like American values.
PICREADI: Is Russia now able to present some interesting alternative to the United States in terms of a way of life, model of society, some different view of the world?
Dmitry Suslov: What can Russia offer others? Russia already offers education, language, a culture that is an integral part of Russia's soft power. Russia offers conservative or, more correctly, not ultra-liberal values. These are 'normal' things from the Russian perspective: when we say 'mom' and 'dad' instead of 'parent 1' and 'parent 2' when we believe that same-sex marriage is wrong; also patriotism, faith. These traditional values are offered by Russia to its partners, and they are greatly supported by the majority of the population and political elites in the post-Soviet space.
In addition, Russia offers public goods – access to the domestic market, effective financial and economic instruments to support those countries that participate in Russia's integration processes. Providing aid is also a very important soft power element. The CIS Countries were the first to whom Russia offered assistance in the first stage of the coronavirus pandemic, sending doctors and equipment. And these countries were among the first to whom Russia will provide assistance in vaccination against coronavirus. These actions will increase Russia's soft power in the region. Russia just needs to do it more and more overtly.
Finally, Russia offers other countries peace, sovereignty, and the ability to choose their own development model, pursue an independent foreign policy. Russia does not force to make a disastrous 'either-or' choice between the United States and China. By strengthening strategic stability and deterrence, as well as pursuing an active foreign and effective policy, Russia reduces the threat of a major war – a war between the great nuclear powers – and prevents the American policy of interventionism, forceful regime change. By developing partnership relations with those countries that value their independence, Russia acts as an important balancer, allowing them not to become a satellite of one of the global great powers.
The thing is that Russia does not yet emphasize this in its foreign policy, although positive developments are already taking place: for example, Russia seeks to play a more important role in the Non-Aligned Movement. Also, Russia together with BRICS partners stands for a fair polycentric world order without a hegemon, in which sovereignty and diversity are respected, and key decisions are taken together. All this strengthens Russian soft power.
In addition, Russia offers public goods – access to the domestic market, effective financial and economic instruments to support those countries that participate in Russia's integration processes. Providing aid is also a very important soft power element. The CIS Countries were the first to whom Russia offered assistance in the first stage of the coronavirus pandemic, sending doctors and equipment. And these countries were among the first to whom Russia will provide assistance in vaccination against coronavirus. These actions will increase Russia's soft power in the region. Russia just needs to do it more and more overtly.
Finally, Russia offers other countries peace, sovereignty, and the ability to choose their own development model, pursue an independent foreign policy. Russia does not force to make a disastrous 'either-or' choice between the United States and China. By strengthening strategic stability and deterrence, as well as pursuing an active foreign and effective policy, Russia reduces the threat of a major war – a war between the great nuclear powers – and prevents the American policy of interventionism, forceful regime change. By developing partnership relations with those countries that value their independence, Russia acts as an important balancer, allowing them not to become a satellite of one of the global great powers.
The thing is that Russia does not yet emphasize this in its foreign policy, although positive developments are already taking place: for example, Russia seeks to play a more important role in the Non-Aligned Movement. Also, Russia together with BRICS partners stands for a fair polycentric world order without a hegemon, in which sovereignty and diversity are respected, and key decisions are taken together. All this strengthens Russian soft power.
PICREADI: Do you think that other countries besides the United States now have sufficient potential to gradually take a leading position in the competition of soft power? Whether, for example, China is able to 'push' the United States, or they are too different cultures a priori and it is too early to talk about a shift in leadership? Will the West in general still lead in the competition of soft power?
Dmitry Suslov: There will be no unambiguous leader. The picture of soft power will reproduce the overall picture in terms of the distribution of power in the world. The world will be polycentric, multicivilizational and multi-layered.
China, of course, will not be able to displace the United States and take the place that the USA occupied during the Сold War and after its end, due to the uniqueness and largely closed nature of the Chinese culture. It is alien to many countries of the world – simply because it is too unique. It is certainly very interesting and great, but it is too alien, and for us, too, compared to the American culture and lifestyle. And because of its cultural uniqueness, China will not be able to claim the place of the US.
China seeks to strengthen its soft power, to position itself as a benevolent great power that stands for harmony, development, mutual help, but few people believe this. And the more powerful and influential China becomes, the more it penetrates various regions of the world, the greater the fear of China becomes. It is unlikely that China will be able to overcome this in the foreseeable future. Therefore, it is difficult to consider China as a global competitor to the United States in terms of soft power.
China, of course, will not be able to displace the United States and take the place that the USA occupied during the Сold War and after its end, due to the uniqueness and largely closed nature of the Chinese culture. It is alien to many countries of the world – simply because it is too unique. It is certainly very interesting and great, but it is too alien, and for us, too, compared to the American culture and lifestyle. And because of its cultural uniqueness, China will not be able to claim the place of the US.
China seeks to strengthen its soft power, to position itself as a benevolent great power that stands for harmony, development, mutual help, but few people believe this. And the more powerful and influential China becomes, the more it penetrates various regions of the world, the greater the fear of China becomes. It is unlikely that China will be able to overcome this in the foreseeable future. Therefore, it is difficult to consider China as a global competitor to the United States in terms of soft power.
However, the soft power of the United States and the West will weaken as overall Eurocentrism will disappear in the world. American soft power reached its peak at a unique time in the history of the world – bipolarity and the brief unipolar moment. In bipolarity, there was a contrast between the free and totalitarian world – the United States and the USSR. At the moment of unipolarity, the United States basically had no competitors and dominated the international arena – including in technology and economic achievements. Now it is becoming more difficult, the weight of the United States is weakening. Sure, the United States remains a superpower, and American soft power will be still palpable due to the dynamism of American society. And, probably, in the foreseeable future, American soft power will be greater in comparison to other great powers. Its relative weight, however, will be reduced. In the world of the middle of the 21st century, most probably, there will be no dominant, as the United States was at the end of the 20th century.
PICREADI: Now, the last question, again inspired by another well-known discussion. When we speak about soft power of Russia or other countries, there is an opinion that since the United States is largely the initiator of soft power active tools and technologies, we need to do everything 'likewise'. Roughly, there is the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and it means that Rossotrudnichestvo should also be transformed into the USAID. If there are American programs for leaders, then we should copy them. Do you agree with this, or does each country need to look for its own recipes?
Dmitry Suslov: Regarding instrumentalization and popularization of passive soft power tools, each country, of course, should rely on its heritage, on its wealth and look for some individual approaches. Russia cannot copy the United States in terms of Hollywood, cinema, music, liberal democratic values and ideology. Russia has other strengths.
A significant difference between the passive components of Russian and American soft power is that the US soft power is largely created by American civil society with minimal state participation. In the case of Russia, state participation is extremely important on a par with the level of civil society. The Russian state is also a driver of Russian soft power, and Russia is a more statist country than the United States. Russia cannot be characterized by the concept of the state as a 'night watchman', neither by the neoliberal ideology à la Ronald Reagan: the fewer state controls, the better. Russia, rather, sees the weakening of the state's control as a threat.
However, as far as the components of active soft power are concerned, Russia has a lot to learn from the United States. Of course, Russia needs to imply its own content in these active components, but they are really universal in many ways. For example, foreign aid. Russian foreign aid should not copy American one, but in principle it should exist and should be positioned as an aid.
The United States is very active in promoting its foreign aid and not only reports to the OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development – editor's note), but also maintains its own national aid statistics which reflect everything – military, economic, humanitarian aid, and assistance provided for the spread of democracy and protection of human rights. For some reason, Russia uses only the criteria of the OECD, despite the country is not included in it and unlikely to enter in the foreseeable future. There are no national Russian statistics at all. There is no open data on how much Russia helps other countries – for example, Belarus, or how much it helped Ukraine before 2014. To learn something about Russia's aid policy, you need to look at the OECD statistics, which cut off a very large part of what Russia actually does. In America, such a situation is simply unthinkable.
Besides, in the U.S., the Department of State is the body responsible for foreign aid. The State Department coordinates the activities of the USAID. In Russia, the provision of assistance is still in the hands of the Ministry of Finance, not Rossotrudnichestvo. We need deep reform of this policy, including institutional reform, and here we have much to learn from the United States.
We also have something to borrow from the United while working with the foreign civil societies and foreign NGOs. We don't need to change regimes, but it is necessary for a principle to work with NGOs, to involve local players in the implementation of Russian projects in foreign countries. We should not reinvent the wheel and claim that the American experience is absolutely unacceptable to us. It is largely acceptable, but we just need to adapt it to the Russian reality.
A significant difference between the passive components of Russian and American soft power is that the US soft power is largely created by American civil society with minimal state participation. In the case of Russia, state participation is extremely important on a par with the level of civil society. The Russian state is also a driver of Russian soft power, and Russia is a more statist country than the United States. Russia cannot be characterized by the concept of the state as a 'night watchman', neither by the neoliberal ideology à la Ronald Reagan: the fewer state controls, the better. Russia, rather, sees the weakening of the state's control as a threat.
However, as far as the components of active soft power are concerned, Russia has a lot to learn from the United States. Of course, Russia needs to imply its own content in these active components, but they are really universal in many ways. For example, foreign aid. Russian foreign aid should not copy American one, but in principle it should exist and should be positioned as an aid.
The United States is very active in promoting its foreign aid and not only reports to the OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development – editor's note), but also maintains its own national aid statistics which reflect everything – military, economic, humanitarian aid, and assistance provided for the spread of democracy and protection of human rights. For some reason, Russia uses only the criteria of the OECD, despite the country is not included in it and unlikely to enter in the foreseeable future. There are no national Russian statistics at all. There is no open data on how much Russia helps other countries – for example, Belarus, or how much it helped Ukraine before 2014. To learn something about Russia's aid policy, you need to look at the OECD statistics, which cut off a very large part of what Russia actually does. In America, such a situation is simply unthinkable.
Besides, in the U.S., the Department of State is the body responsible for foreign aid. The State Department coordinates the activities of the USAID. In Russia, the provision of assistance is still in the hands of the Ministry of Finance, not Rossotrudnichestvo. We need deep reform of this policy, including institutional reform, and here we have much to learn from the United States.
We also have something to borrow from the United while working with the foreign civil societies and foreign NGOs. We don't need to change regimes, but it is necessary for a principle to work with NGOs, to involve local players in the implementation of Russian projects in foreign countries. We should not reinvent the wheel and claim that the American experience is absolutely unacceptable to us. It is largely acceptable, but we just need to adapt it to the Russian reality.
Photo by Chandra Maharzan on Unsplash
The interviewer was Viktoria Ivanchenko, editor-in-chief of picreadi.ru
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